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A:rnerican Military Observer ttMission"
to Yen an and the Chinese Co:rn:rnunists,
1944-1945: Its Political I:rnplications
T ong~Chin Rhee
In every respect, the year 1944 marked a significant turning point in the fortunes of
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government and China's relations with the
United States.
During the entire span of the Pacific war, the primary and exclusive aim of the United
States had been the earliest possible conclusion of the war against Japan through the
latter's unconditional surrender. For this incontrovertible end, Washington had pursued a
consistent but myopic military policy of keeping China in the war, at all costs, in order to
make the maximal use of her military potential and strategic geographic location in the
common endeavor. Along with this policy and as an important and "logical" adjunct, the
Roosevelt Administration had made all possible efforts to make China a great power.
China as a great power, in Secretary Cordell Hull 's words, would thus be "entitled to
equal rank with the three big Western Allies, Russia, Britain, and the United States," and
would be a "principal stabilizing factor" in the postwar Far East'!
In this scheme of policy , there were several immediate objectives the United States had
to accomplish: (1) the prevention of a military collapse of China; (2) the avoidance of a
large scale military clash between the National Government and the Chinese Communists;
(3) the harmonization of the two for the immediate purpose of the utilization of the
Communist forces against Japan and for the ultimate goal of a coalition government in
China. The United States had not only regarded the above as necessary for the war effort,
but vastly indispensable for China's great power role in the postwar world.
Underlying this was the American assumption that the Soviet Union would extend its
war-time cooperation into the future maintenance of peace and order in the world. This
assumption seemed to be logical under the circumstances then prevailing - the cordial
and close friendship between Moscow and Washington. A " strong, united and
democratic " China and a cooperative Soviet Union would then enable the United States
to m ediate realistically their differences for the greater good of Far Eastern peace.
Should such a grand design be feasible - which the United States then deemed highly
probable - the only immediate task the Allies and the United States had to perform was
simply to defeat Japan in the shortest possible time. It thus seemed in the eyes of
Washington that the entire structure of political and military schemes constituted a
"coherent whole."
In making such a calculation, however, the United States had unfortunately
committed gross misjudgments on a host of important key questions: (1) on the
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intentions of the Soviet Union; (2) the international Communist movement; and (3) on
the character of ultimate intentions of the Chinese Communist Party. When neither the
Soviet Union nor the Chinese Communists behaved as Washington expected, the entire
structure of American policy vis-a-vis China collapsed accordingly. A prominent China
scholar explained the situation as follows:
(The 1 structure took its consistency and its rationale from a military rather than a
political objective. In the flux of unfolding events, the political policy became
simply a means to achieve the military goal. This reversal of the rational order of
political end and military means was the wartime expression of the traditional
American divorce of diplomacy from military power. Since the military objective
was the paramount goal, the political implications of American military measures
were not taken fully into consideration and military strategy was not planned in the
light of its political effects on the internal stability of China. 2
More specifically, Washington had somehow failed to take into account China's
misfortunes in modern decades and the seriousness of her domestic problems - resulting
in over optimistic expectations for her renaissance as a major world power in the
relatively short run. Moreover, the seemingly prevalent mood of patriotic enthusiasm of
the United Front (between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party) seemed
to have falsely indicated the existence of a healthy growth of nationalistic aspirations
among the Chinese - totally incompatible with the Communist ideologies as practiced by
Moscow. Having thus failed to observe the significance of a growing conflict between the
KMT and the CCP, Washington has simply decided to treat China as a great power. 3
From the " revolutionary whirlpool" of China early in the century, the Kuomintang
had risen first under Dr. Sun Vat-sen and later under General Chiang Kai-shek. Emerging
into prominence with politico-military power and stature, the KMT was in no small
measure assisted by its cooperation with the Soviet Union and the infant Chinese
Communist Party. However, the decade of struggle (1927-1937) between the two parties
after the 1927 break was marked by the gradual effacement of the KMT's revolutionary
zeal and dynamism and the consequent loss of popular enthusiasm and support.
Alongside the gradual deterioration of the KMT's political foundation, the Communists
had achieved rapid growth. The famed Long March had provided the Communists with a
legend and a conviction of their ultimate revolutionary success. Mao Tse-tung's rise to
power had greatly matured the CCP and carved a preponderant place in popular
imagination. While the growing hostility between the two parties had deepened the
national division, it accelerated the KMT's reactionary tendency.
Under such unfortunate conditions, China had been involved in a protracted war of
resistanc e against Japan ever since 1931. Despite her pre-capitalistic industrial structure
and the limited military capability, China had miraculously sustained her existence. After
Pearl Harbor, to sustain China as a " fighting ally, " the United States had assigned her
ranking officers to the China Theater. Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell was
instructed to effect the necessary military reforms with a view to increasing Chinese
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military capabilities.
However, Stilwell's mlSSlOn ended in total disillusionment for Washington. With her
anarchic internal conditions, confused state of governmental authorities, and deeply
engrained political division, China proved to be an impossible assignment for Stilwell. To
compound the problem, Stilwell's personality and finesse were not equal to the difficult
and hopelessly tangled tasks. His political naivete, lack of statesmanlike qualities and
frequent asperity transformed essentially impersonal strategic and tactical problems with
the Chinese leadership into major feuds of great international importance. Again , it is not
to be denied that the obsessive American preoccupation with " military expediency" had
aided such a development of events.
In addition to the "Stilwell Affair," with the advent of 1944, Germany 's collapse was
predicted. The "Europe First" theme was slowly coming to an end. Through late 1943
and up to mid-1944, American forces in the Pacific had dealt Japan severe blows.
Long-range strategic bombing, and mobile naval and air strike forces had virtually
beleaguered Japan. On the other hand, China was rapidly losing her strategic importance
to the Allies. In spite of the strenuous efforts to reform the Chinese army, apathy and
obstructions had rendered the American project wholly unsuccessful. The growing
disputes between Washington and Chungking had created an atmosphere in which no
harmony and cooperation were possible.
The decline of the China Theater's importance in Washington 's military calculations
was not solely attributable to a single factor. Politically, the United States had begun to
realize the hopelessly tangled state of China's internal problems. However, despite such
realization, Washington saw no immediate usefulness in their solution, as it was solely
interested in the earliest possible "military" victory. In this political myopia, the United
States failed to give proper consideration to the problems that beset China - particularly
those of the CCP.
During the relatively quiet years of the war in China, the problems did not surface
seriously. Then in mid-1944 , the situation suddenly changed to a crisis atmosphere. The
Japanese forces had launched seemingly determined offensives against the Chinese forces.
American reform efforts having failed, the Chinese Army seemed to be facing imminent
total collapse. Confronted with the crisis, Washington had unwittingly given unduly
exaggerated emphasis to the military considerations alone. Urged by Stilwell, and strongly
backed by General Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson - and continuously supported
by Foreign Service Officers in China - the Roosevelt Administration had pressed Chiang
Kai-shek to withdraw the military blockade of the Communist area and to employ the
Communist forces for a unified resistance against Japan. Secretary of State Dean Acheson
testified years later;
... it seemed highly probable ... that, unless the Chinese could subordinate their
internal interests to the larger interest of the united war effort ... Chinese
resistance would become completely ineffective and the Japanese would be able to
deprive the Allies of valuable bases ... 4
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By 1944, the situation faced by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was not an enviable
one: the worsened relations with Washington, the critical military situation, and the
ever-growing Communist threat. The Communist threat was most serious. Up to 1944,
political and military shrewdness had enabled Yenan (1) to expand and consolidate its
revolutionary "rural base areas"; (2) to enlist increased popular support; (3) to increase
its military and para-military forces; (4) to inflltrate into the KMT areas to arouse the
peasantry and to propagate its revolutionary cause; and (5) to win over great segments of
the intelligentsia and the student class. On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung's On New
Democracy (January 1940) and New Democratic Constitutionalism (February 1940)
seemed to corroborate the "correctness" of the then American understanding of Chinese
Communism - namely, the reformist and the democratic nature of the movement. The
"de-radicalized" nature of the Communist statement had been designed particularly to
cultivate such misunderstanding. Indeed, while the KMT was plagued with corruption,
inefficiency and debility, the Chinese Communists at Yenan seemed to evince a healthy
sign of strength and sincerity , and a seemingly genuine interest in the welfare of the
masses.
The United States military and diplomatic representatives in China kept Washington
informed of the rapidly degenerating nature of Chiang's regime. Years later, Secretary
Acheson wrote:
In the opinion of many observers they [the KMT] had sunk into corruption , into a
scramble for place and power, and into reliance on the United States to win the war
for them and to preserve their own domestic supremacy ... The stresses and strains
of war were now rapidly weakening such liberal elements as it did possess and
strengthening the grip of the reactionaries ... The mass of the Chinese people were
coming more and more to lose confidence in the Government. 5
A sort of climax was thus reached by the mid-1940's: Yenan's successful combination
of Communist revolution and the " peasant revolution," and the impasse between
Washington and Chungking. Greatly concerned over the future of Chiang's regime, the
United States had adopted a coalition formula as the only "realistic" solution to the
China Problem. Nonetheless, this was generally taken - both by Chungking and Yenan to mean Washington's tacit recognition of the Chinese Communists, and inadvertently
affected the outcome of the Chungking-Y enan conflict in favor of the latter.
Unfortunately, Washington had all along failed to recognize the futility of a detente
between Chungking and Yenan - not realizing the true nature and intentions of the
Chinese Communist Party. Undoubtedly, both parties in China had totally incomp atible
aims - dedicated only to a total and complete monoply of power at the unmitigated
expense of each other. This precluded any meaningful compromise between them. This
had been amply proved through various negotiations between the two up to 1944.
On December 6, 1943, during the time of the Cairo Conference, General Stilwell and
his political adviser John P. Davies raised the question with Roosevelt. In the exchange of
opinion on China, Davies had strongly reminded the President that another Japanese
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military attack on KMT China "might overturn" Chiang's political power. To this
Roosevelt curtly replied: "Well, then we should look for some other man or group of
men, to carry on ... ,,6 With reference to this remark, it ought to be remembered that the
President's views on China had undergone some important changes through the Cairo and
Teheran Conferences - based on various reports on Chiang's incompetence and lethargy.
Encouraged by Roosevelt's remarks, Davies immediately suggested that the United
States send a military observer mission to Yenan. Roughly six months before, June 24,
1943, John Davies had submitted a lengthy memorandum on the Chinese Communist
problem. In it, Davies had argued that the "Communist regime in present policy is far
removed from orthodox Communism; that it is administratively remarkably honest"
compared to the gloom and pessimism in Chungking. For instance, Davies cited (1) the
popular elections; (2) the "individual economic freedom"; (3) a strong trend toward
nationalistic fervor among the Red soldiers; (4) the strong popular support among the
masses. Davies further suggested that the Chinese Communists could better be called the
"agrarian democrats" rather than orthodox Communists. Warning that a civil war might
occur shortly due to the desperate KMT desire to liquidate the Communists, Davies
recommended a direct American contact with Yenan:
We cannot afford to incur the risk of our present hands-off policy toward China. It
is a ·policy of drifting with the course of events . We need a more positive policy, one
in which we shall have a larger degree of control over the shaping of our own
destiny in Asia ... 7
The significance of this memorandum was that Davies was Stilwell's highest ranking
political adviser and was directly responsible to the Theater Commander. From this
position - and from their close personal relations - Davies' proposals reflected closely
Stilwell's own ideas on the China question. It is to be noted then that early in 1943
Davies had made several contacts with Chou En-lai, and was told that "for really effective
liaison [the United States] should have a small group of officers [in Yenan].,,8 At the
end of 1943, Davies again raised the issue more forcefully. Concluding that Chiang's
regime was in serious jeopardy, Davies argued that the United States had reached a point
to totally reappraise her policy toward Chungking on a "realistic basis." Davies added:
In this uncertain situation we should avoid committing ourselves unalterably to
Chiang. We should be ready during or after the war to adjust ourselves to possible
realignments in China. We should wish, for example, to avoid finding ourselves at
the close of the war backing a coalition of [Chiang] and the degenerate puppets
against a democratic coalition commanding Russian sympathy. 9
Based on this, Davies had recommended a " readiness to support a strong new coalition
offering cooperation mutually more beneficial to China and the United States. "l 0
Following this, Davies formally proposed an American military observer mission to
Yenan on January 15, 1944. Soon Stilwell approved the project, and so did the President
and his close advisers in Washington. However, Chiang'S reaction was necessarily negative
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arguing that the political implications involved would make his posltlOn more
untenable and make all relations with Yenan more difficult. He feared that an American
mission, no matter what the ostensible justification, would greatly enhance the political
standing of the Chinese Communist Party in China - especially with the people.
This problem was to be settled in favor of the American proposal only through Vice
President Henry A. Wallace's mission to China in June, 1944, the primary objective of
which was to secure a conciliation between Chungking and Yenan - through heavy
pressures on Chiang. Needless to say, the prompting factors were the great Japanese
offensives in China and Washington's rising fear of China's immediate collapse .
Washington immediately put pressure on Chiang to employ the Communist forces and to
give an overall command authority to General Stilwell.
On June 23, 1944, in a meeting with Wallace, Chiang Kai-shek reversed his earlier
opposition and approved the dispatch of the military observers to Yenan. However, he
warned that the Mission's task should represent equal pressure on Yenan and on himself,
and that any political implication should be well guarded against because of possible
adverse consequences to his future relations with Yenan.
But prior to its departure, a group of Chinese and foreign correspondents were
permitted to enter the CCP areas. Since the request for the trip in February, the Chinese
Government had delayed the permission for several months only to reason later that it
was apolitical in nature (unlike the military mission), and thus was permissible.
Chungking had rightly insisted that any military mission would be construed as an
expression of a de facto recognition of the rebel regime in Yenan - a recognition by the
most influential power, the United States. Indeed, Mao Tse-tung's enthusiastic welcome
of the correspondents seemed immediately to verify Chiang's fears. 11 To Chiang's great
horror, American reporters were greatly impressed by the Communists and came to
believe that the CCP were truly nothing but "agrarian reformists."
It was in this atmosphere that the American Military Observer Group (DIXIE Mission)
flew into Yenan in July. The mission was composed of sixteen officers and men and was
accompanied by two of the most important Foreign Service officers - John S. Service
and Raymond P. Ludden - attached to General Stilwell as political advisers. Although
nominally led by a military officer, Colonel David D. Barrett, and instructed to limit its
operations to the collection of "intelligence concerning both our allies and the enemy,"
there was another important provision of great political importance. The directives
added: "Under no circumstances will you [Barrett] engage in discussions or make
commitments of any kind pertaining to political, economic, sociological, or military
[sic]. All matters of policy and commitments remain responsibility of theater
commander [Stilwell]."1 2 The important point then was that Stilwell as a theater
commander had the authority to discuss "All matters of policy" and the authority to
make " commitments" with the Communists. This function could be reasonably assumed
to have been delegated to the political officers - Service and Ludden. Another important
question was: If the main objective of the mission was merely the collection of military
intelligence, as was explained to Chiang, why were the important political officers sent
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from Stilwell's headquarters with the above instructions? The safest assumption would
have to be that the American authorities in China intended to pursue the
recommendations generally outlined by John P. Davies in his various memoranda prior to
this date , which I have briefly described above : namely, that the United States would
weigh the possibility of recognizing the Communists as a substitute regime to Chiang's in
Chungking.
Indeed, Yenan received the American military mission as the symbol of "American
sympathy with [its] cause and wish to cooperate [with it].,,13 As suspected, despite
strong United States' denials of the political nature of the mission, Mao Tse-tung had
remarked to John Service that: "any contact you Americans may have with us
Communists is good. Of course, we are glad to have the Observer Section here because it
will help beat Japan. But there is no use in pretending - up to now at least - the chief
importance of your coming is its political effect upon the [KMT]."14 The mission's
reaction to such a Communist attitude was throughout ambiguous. By neither accepting
nor repudiating the Communist territory, the United States had in fact totally dissipated
her political influence on the possible future solution of the China question.
Chiang Kai-shek's fear - the possibility of adverse political effects the mission would
have on the relations between him and Mao - was justified under the situation then
prevailing. Despite the Wallace Mission and the American Military Observer Group, the
Communists were as remote as ever from any genuine efforts to settle the problems with
the KMT. On the contrary, by sending a military mission to Yenan, Washington had
inadvertently given an unintended impression to the Communists: to wit, that the United
States' support of Chiang was indeed conditional, and that there was considerable
possibility for Yenan to establish direct and closer relations with Washington even to the
point of entirely supplanting Chiang in China. Indeed, a few months prior to the dispatch
of the mission to Yenan, John Service told his superiors:
The Communists would undoubtedly plan [play?] an important part in a genuinely
unified China - one not unified by the Kuomintang's present policy in practice of
military force and threat. But it is most probable that such a democratic and
unified China would naturally gravitate toward the United States and that the
United States, by virtue of a sympathy, position, and economic resources, would
enjoy a greater influence in China than any other foreign power. 1S
Furthermore, in early June, 1944, the State Department sent a message to its Chungking
and Moscow Embassies stating that "The American government was not committed to
support the National Government of China in any and all circumstances. It was not
concerned with doctrinal questions between contending Chinese groups; it was concerned
with the effectuation of a program that would benefit the Chinese people. ,,16 The
Communists felt the import of the message and immediately seized on this opportunity
to extend their hostile propaganda campaigns against the National Government. No
doubt, the military mission and the innate ideas it represented - whatever its true
intention - had brought about this turn of events in China. Had the United States'
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position been one of pressuring Chiang and Mao to come to terms with each other, she in
fact destroyed that possibility by misleading the Communists into believing the greater
benefit of intransigence and determination.
The wallace Mission, the military mission and the enormous pressures borne solely by
Chiang Kai-shek during this time had made two important developments inevitable. First,
Chiang could no longer go along with the proposals of the United States for they might
mean his own political suicide. For this reason, he had to reject the ideas of a coalition
army with the Communists and of installing Stilwell as the supreme commander of all
forces as was proposed. By so doing, the overall relations with Washington had further
deteriorated and invigorated the latter's desire to lean toward Yenan for a possible
solution. Secondly, the Communists had not missed any of the deeper implications of this
development on the respective standing of Chungking and Yenan. They had thus fortified
their derogatory propaganda against Chiang and intensified their pro-American
pretenses in order to draw Washington closer to Yenan.
Soon, Stilwell was replaced by General Albert C. Wedemeyer and the military mission
at Yenan continued its intimate contact with the Communists. As an immediate result,
three alternative plans for arming and utilizing the Communist forces were drawn during
this period. This included, among others, politically ill-guided relations between the
Office of the Strategic Services (OSS) and the Yenan Communists. The consequences
were not long in coming. Immediately after the dialogues between the Americans and the
Chinese Communists, and especially after the OSS contact, the Communist spokesman
and go-between Chou En-lai informed General Patrick J . Hurley, the new American
ambassador to China, that the political negotiations with the National Government "were
at an end." Throughout the latter part of 1944, in fact, the Communists had taken a
generally intransigent attitude toward a negotiated settlement with the Chungking
Government.
Through October and November 1944, blunt conclusions were driven home to
Washington - by John Service, John Davies, and Raymond Ludden - about the
pessimistic future of the KMT regime. Both were emphatic about the possibility of
Chiang's imminent collapse, and stressed the need for a realistic re-evaluation of American
policy. Davies bluntly stated that the United States should not "indefinitely underwrite a
politically bankrupt regime " in China; that " in seeking to determine which faction we
should support we must keep in mind these basic considerations: Power in China is on the
verge of shifting from Chiang to the Communists."17
On November 7, 1944, Davies again reported to Washington:
The Chinese Communists are so strong between the Great wall and Yangtze that
they can now look forward to the postwar control of at least North China . .. The
Communists have survived ten years of civil war and seven years of Japanese
offensives. They have survived .. . and they have grown ... And they will continue
to grow ... 18
On the same date , Davies emphasized: "The Communists are in China today. And China's
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destiny is not Chiang's but theirs.,,19
On the other hand, John Service had felt even before his visit to Yenan with the
military observers that the Chinese Communists were friendly to the United States. He
reported on April 12, 1944:
The Communists ... also are friendly toward America, believe that democracy
must be the next step in China, and take the view that economic collaboration with
the United States is the only hope for [China 1. It is vital that we do not lose this
good will and influence. 2 0
This naive belief was further strengthened after his contacts with the Communists. For on
September 28, 1944, Service concluded that the " politically orientation which the
Chinese Communists may once have had toward the Soviet Union seems a thing of the
past. ,,2 1 His belief was the result of his conversations with the leaders of the Communist
Party at Yenan. How and why Service attached such credence to the Communist
statements, no one can ascertain correctly. One thing is certain. Service could not detect
in the Communist statements their clear plan of a "tactical adjustment" to the postwar
political situation in the Far East - with the United States controlling the central
position.
An equally naive understanding of the Chinese Communists existed among all the
members of the Military Observer Group. Israel Epstein reported as follows:
Generally, the Americans were greatly impressed with what they saw. The degree of
mobilization, atmosphere of confidence and total absence of war weariness
exhilarated them . . . A young officer who saw a picture of Chiang Kai-shek in a
Yenan reception hall said: "My God, do we have to think about that so-and-so here
too? What we could do with these people if he didn't interfere." Accordingly, in
their free and frequent contact with Eight Route Army leaders, members of the
mission began to develop lines of inquiry which may have exceeded their
competence but flowed inevitably from their desire to beat the enemy and get
home. 22
Consistent with the general theme of their understanding of the CCP, Service reported
on October 10, 1944: "In the present circumstances, the Kuomintang is dependent on
American support for survival. But we are in no way dependent on the
Kuomintang ... Encouraged by our support the Kuomintang will continue in its present
course, progressively losing the confidence of the people and becoming more and more
impotent. Ignored by us, and excluded from the Government ... the Communists .. . will
be forced to guard their own in terests by more direct opposition.,,2 3 But there was an
implicit call for recognition of the Chinese Communist Party which was further advanced
by John Davies - a close associate and immediate superior to Service:
It is time that we unequivocally told Chiang Kai-shek that we will work with and,
within our discretion, supply whatever Chinese forces we believe can contribute
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most to the war against Japan ... It is time that we make clear to Chiang Kai-shek
that we expect the Chinese to settle their own political differences ; that we refuse
to become further involved in and party to Chinese domestic political
disputes ... 24
In this over-emphasis of military considerations, namely the overriding desire for an
early defeat of Japan and the disregard for political consequences, Raymond Ludden and
Service made the following argument on February 14, 1945:
American policy in the Far East can have but one immediate objective: the defeat
of Japan in the shortest possible time ... To the attainment of this objective all
other considerations should be subordinate. 2 5
Pressing the issue further, the American charge d'affaires in Chungking, George Atcheson,
summed up the views of the Foreign Service Officers on February 26 by recommending
that the United States bypass Chiang Kai-shek and take direct steps "to cooperate with
and supply the Communists and other suitable groups who can aid in this war against
Japan."26
Then in early 1945, the episode of the American military mission reached a sudden
end - mainly by default - owing chiefly to the growing conflict and open hostility
between Ambassador Patrick J . Hurley and the Foreign Service Officers - including
Davies, Service, Ludden , and Atcheson. The difference of views rapidly grew, shortly
after Hurley'S succession to the Embassy and after the recall of Stilwell.
Hurley soon realized that continuing contact between the mission and the Communists
at Yenan was increasing Communist intransigence and accordingly reduced the prospect
of a negotiated settlement between Chiang's regime and the CCP. These complications
had climaxed in an open clash in January 1945 - on the eve of the Yalta Conference. The
charges of sabotage against Hurley 's efforts for mediation were hurled against General
Wedemeyer's headquarters, to which the mission was subordinate. In March 1945, in
order to restore harmonious relations between the Embassy and the Theater Command,
Wedemeyer had ordered the end of political negotiations with the Communists to all his
officers - including the Foreign Service officers. Col. Barrett was now replaced by Col.
Ivan Yeaton - " a real expert on Communism who had formerly been military attache in
Moscow" - and all the political officers were withdrawn from Yenan.
However, despite this reorganization and restriction of the mission's role, political
damage of a very serious kind had already been committed. Although it was of short
duration , and what was pursued by the mission was less by design than by political
naivete, the dialogue between the mission and the Communists had inevitably created a
false image of the American policy toward Yanan. If the United States' policy was for the
maintenance of Chiang's regime - which was in fact the basis of American policy - the
Foreign Service Officers' ill-conceived contacts had destroyed the credibility of American
support. The Communists were also impressed by the American reluctance to promise
unconditional support to Chiang in case Yenan did not live up to American expectation.
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On the other hand, the American obsession with democracy and constitutional rule,
expressed in continual criticisms of the Chiang regime, had revealed that Washington's
support of Chiang would not reach a dangerous point as far as the Communists were
concerned. In either case, the Communists would have nothing to fear from Washington's
position. They were fortified in their conviction that decades of revolutionary efforts
were on the verge of complete success in China. Yenan was further convinced that
beyond a momentary "tactical adjustment" there was no necessity for basic concessions
to Chiang Kai-shek.
From this, it would be fair to conclude that the choice of personnel was most
unfortunate for the United States. Had the United States realized the long-term political
implications of the mission, she could have more closely supervised the Theater
Command's selection of its members. The basic problem was not what the United States
really intended to do in China but how she represented that position on operational levels
with unequivocal clarity. This the Foreign Service Officers had failed to do ; to a great
extent the failure was the logical extension of their personal philosophy .
General Stilwell was a brave, honest and fine commander. Nonetheless, he was
"politically uninformed" and romantic. As Freda Utley, who knew him, described:
" .. . His horizon did not extend beyond 'winning the war.' He had no conception of
the problems which beset the Chinese Government, since he had no knowledge ot
Communism ... His asperity cloaked a soft heart and a sentimental political outlook
which made him react blindly to suffering and injustice without seeking their
cause ... ,,27 John P. Davies as American consul in Hankow knew Stilwell, who was then
American military attache. Both had developed mutual admiration . And when Stilwell
became the Theater Commander, Davies became his chief political adviser. It was Davies
who then recommended John Service and Raymond Ludden as his associates within
Stilwell's Command. Of the two, Service was a "misinformed liberal" as far as
totalitarianism and Communism were concerned. 28 Service felt that the Chinese
Communists were democratic and popular, and further insisted that the "Communist
revolution has been moderate.,,29 He not only believed the Chinese Communists were
independent of Moscow at the time, but maintained that they could be won over to the
American side through diplomacy. Furthermore, to a certain extent, these people all
believed that the Communists represented a new hope for China and that the solution to
China's problems could only be obtained by eliminating Chiang Kai-shek. 3 0 With such
preconceived notions and biases, they were the poor traegers of American policy - as was
conceived then. Their contacts with the Communists could not have been but the
misrepresentation of the main objectives of the United States. Although unintentional
and inadvertent, they had contributed to withdrawing credence from American policy.
Herein, perhaps, lay the fundamental cause of the eventual failure of the Marshall Mission
during 1946.
In retrospect, the American attempt to establish direct communications with the
Communists had failed without any significant results - as expected by the United
States. However, Washington's basic misunderstanding of the nature and objectives of the
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Chinese Communists, and its overemphasis of military factors to the exclusion of political
considerations had deepened the ambiguity of the American position to such an extent
that she had not only doomed the Kuomintang's self-confidence prematurely but
accelerated the Communist takeover in China.
Looking back, the best policy under the circumstances should have been : (1) to
extend the military mission to a truly effective instrument of communication with the
Communists; (2) to impress unmistakably upon the Communists that the United States'
conditional support of Chiang Kai-shek did not imply an unconditional support of any
and all alternative political powers in China; and (3) to tell them clearly that Washington
would have to support the National Government should Yenan choose to be consistently
defiant and destructive in all efforts for negotiated settlement based on principles of
reciprocity .
Had the United States done this, there might have been a much better chance for a
negotiated settlement - if that was possible at all - between Chiang and Yenan. This
truly realistic policy (and not the untenable pretension of "aloofness" from the Chinese
internal conflict) - coupled with the tremendous influence Washington could then exert
in China - might have broken the impasse. Once the military mission was sent to Yenan,
Washington should have firmly warned the Communists that its frustration with Chiang
was based on the issues of socio-political reforms and did not concern the unqualified
American desire to replace him with an uncertain substitute. However, Washington could
not make up its mind what to do with Chiang or with Yenan. The prolonged hesitance
with unclear alternatives allowed the Chinese Communists to interpret the stated
American in tent to support Chiang as a meaningless bluff. Needless to say, the military
mission had furthered such misinterpretation. In this situation, Marshall's mediation in
1946 had neither credibility for its impartiality nor teeth in its hinted retaliation.
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